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15 Introduction
16 Uzbekistan became an independent state in 1991
17 following the demise of the Soviet Union.
18 Coming on the heels of a global discourse on
19 good governance and decentralization, Uzbeki-
20 stan embarked on the highly complex task of
21 reforming its public administration system. The
22 implementation of these reforms, however, pro-
23 ved to be a daunting task, since the country had to
24 deal with its Soviet legacy and its internal power
25 structures and contradictions: weak state institu-
26 tions, poorly developed national identities, and
27entrenched subnational political networks (cf.,
28Ilkhamov 2004; Markowitz 2008; Melvin 2004).
29Local government is one of the most problem-
30atic areas in Uzbekistan where the failure of the
31reform initiatives is quite evident. This chapter
32delineates the processes involved and explores
33the context, problems, quality, and trajectories of
34local governance in Uzbekistan. More specifi-
35cally, it addresses the following two questions:
36(a) What are the responsibilities of local govern-
37ments and do they carry them out in an adequate
38and efficient manner? (b) How do local govern-
39ments involve communities and their organiza-
40tions in the governing process in terms of the
41principles of good governance, such as transpar-
42ency, accountability, rule of law, voice, democ-
43racy, and accountability? In doing so, the paper
44examines four conditions: contextual, structural,
45institutional, and human resource. These condi-
46tions are considered to be factors that can account
47for the capacity of local governments in
48Uzbekistan.
49The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: the
50next section describes the internal structure of
51local governments, which will be instructive in
52understanding the conditions under which they
53function in Uzbekistan. This is followed by the
54presentation of a brief overview of the tasks
55and service delivery responsibilities of local gov-
56ernments. The financial conditions and actual ser-
57vice delivery capacity of local governments are
58then discussed. The section after that examines
59the relations between the central and local
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60 government, followed by concluding remarks on
61 the main trends and challenges local governments
62 face. Suggestions on areas for governance reform
63 are also provided.
64 The Internal Structure of Local
65 Governments
66 In Uzbekistan, the local government consists of
67 a local state administration (administrative body)
68 and an elected local council (legislative body) at
69 the regional (oblast) and district (raion) levels.
70 Representatives are appointed/elected for a period
71 of 5 years. The local administration represents
72 the executive and regulatory bodies of the state
73 at the regional, district, or city/town levels and
74 implements the policies of the president and cen-
75 tral government in the provinces. All the heads of
76 the local state administrations are appointed by
77 the central government, subject to [symbolical]
78 approval by the corresponding local councils
79 (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001). The president
80 appoints regional (oblast level) governors, who in
81 turn appoint district and city/town governors that
82 come under regional subordination. Thus, the dis-
83 trict and city governors are accountable to the
84 regional governor, who in turn is accountable to
85 the president. This means that local governors
86 often experience double or even triple subordina-
87 tion, being accountable to the regional governor,
88 the central government, and the president.
89 The local councils, running alongside the local
90 state administrations, are the primary local legis-
91 lative bodies. The council representatives are
92 elected by the residents of the respective
93 administrative-territorial units through general
94 and direct vote (Bektemirov and Rahimov
95 2001). As elected bodies, the local councils are
96 expected to express and realize the will of the
97 citizens in their respective administrative-
98 territorial units. At least in theory, local councils
99 can exert some influence over their administrative
100 bodies. However, this is not the case in practice
101 as the heads of the local state administrations
102 enjoy absolute power in the management of local
103 affairs (e.g., Popa and Munteanu 2001). Since all
104 the governors are appointed, the local councils
105cannot exert significant influence on them. Even
106though governors periodically report to their
107local councils on the current situation of the terri-
108tory, this process is mainly symbolic in nature
109(Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001). This is because
110the governors of the regional, city, or district state
111administrations simultaneously exercise execu-
112tive authority and serve as local council chairmen.
113This means it is very difficult to distinguish
114between the functions of the local state adminis-
115tration and the local self-government bodies, since
116the same individual (i.e., the governor) heads both
117branches of power.
118In addition to the regional and district
119state administrations, there are sub-district level
120governance institutions –mahalla committees – in
121towns and rural areas. Mahalla committees
122were part of the state farms, collective farms,
123and enterprises during the Soviet era, but
124shortly after independence, Uzbek authorities
125revamped these institutions, assigning them
126new legal status as “local self-government
127bodies of citizens” (Giffen et al. 2005). Mahalla
128committees assist district/town administrations
129in implementing local development projects,
130collecting taxes, administering social welfare pro-
131grams, maintaining and repairing roads, disposing
132of waste, ensuring security and order, removing
133garbage, maintaining playgrounds and sports
134fields, and many other tasks that are of local
135importance (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001;
136Urinboyev 2011). Regarding the financing and
137autonomy of these sub-district self-government
138institutions vis-a-vis the higher-level local state
139administrations, they are fully dependent on
140budget allocations from the latter and regularly
141report to the head of the district or city/town
142administrations. The chairmen and secretaries
143of the mahalla committees are salaried state offi-
144cials. This means that mahalla committees do not
145have any real capacity to act as sites of local
146democracy and participation but merely serve
147as sub-district extensions of the local state
148administrations.
149However, it should be noted that some form
150of informal autonomy can be observed at the
151level of the informal/social mahalla. Hence,
152there is a need to distinguish between the mahalla
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153 committees (administrative mahalla) and the
154 informal mahallas (social mahalla). The Uzbek
155 people usually refer to the chairmen of the
156 mahalla committees as the “eyes and ears of the
157 local government” (“quloq” in the Uzbek lan-
158 guage), given the fact that they serve the interests
159 of the local government. The leaders of the social
160 mahallas, on the other hand, are elected by
161 mahalla residents during informal gatherings in
162 mosques or teahouses (guzar). They work pro
163 bono for the community and represent the inter-
164 ests of the mahalla people. The social mahallas
165 function informally and autonomously and can
166 thus be regarded as a genuine citizen self-
167 government institution (Urinboyev 2014, 2018).
168 They offer a community-based alternative dispute
169 resolution mechanism and provide a space for
170 informal governance of everyday life and social
171 relations. The analysis of scholarly literature
172 shows that for many Uzbeks, social mahallas are
173 more legitimate and easily accessible than the
174 formal state institutions (Aminova and Jegers
175 2011; Masaru 2006; Sievers 2002; Urinboyev
176 2011, 2013a, b).
177 Tasks and Service Delivery
178 Responsibilities of Local Governments
179 The tasks decentralized to local governments
180 in Uzbekistan include environmental protection,
181 prevention of natural and technological accidents,
182 fire protection, public sanitation, public order and
183 security, local economic and social development,
184 culture, tourism, sports, maintenance of leisure
185 facilities, communal services (e.g., water, gas,
186 electricity, heat, waste management, sewage,
187 engineering infrastructures), construction, main-
188 tenance and local road repair, public transport,
189 employment and job creation support, and the
190 development of small and medium enterprises.
191 Almost all healthcare services are provided
192 by the public authorities. The central government
193 manages healthcare services through the regional,
194 district, and city/town level healthcare offices
195 of the Ministry of Health. Healthcare services
196 are primarily financed by the central budget
197 and administered by territorial structures of the
198respective ministry. The local government is
199only responsible for the maintenance and renova-
200tion of healthcare institutions (Bektemirov and
201Rahimov 2001). Schooling is the joint responsi-
202bility of the central and local government in the
203sense that the local offices of the Ministry of
204Education pay teachers’ wages and oversee
205administrative control; other expenditures such
206as school maintenance are included in the local
207government budget (Bektemirov and Rahimov
2082001).
209Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
210Tajikistan where local governments are responsi-
211ble mainly for providing social assistance to
212needy families, the mahalla committees
213(administrative mahalla) in Uzbekistan are
214responsible for the administration and targeting
215of state social welfare benefits, such as child
216and maternity benefits, and social assistance to
217low-income families, families with children
218under 16, and single mothers with children under
2192 (Coudouel and Marnie 1999; Micklewright and
220Marnie 2005). Funding for these programs is
221established centrally as part of the consolidated
222budget expenditures, which in turn are transferred
223to the mahalla committees. The remaining social
224protection programs (e.g., pensions, veterans of
225the war benefits) are the responsibility of the dis-
226trict/city level units of the Ministry of Labor and
227Social Protection (Bektemirov and Rahimov
2282001).
229Financial Conditions and Actual Service
230Delivery Capacity of Local Governments
231One of the most important criteria used by the
232citizens to assess the performance of local
233governments is the quality and accessibility of
234local public services (Popa and Munteanu 2001).
235However, there are only a few studies with data on
236citizens’ satisfaction with local government
237performance in Uzbekistan. This is because
238Uzbekistan has long been a heavily authoritarian
239and closed country, making it difficult for local
240and foreign organizations and researchers to eval-
241uate the performance and effectiveness of the
242local government in the country. Neema Noori’s
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243 (2006) study of decentralization processes in
244 Uzbekistan is one of the few in this respect.
245 As Noori argues, decentralization has had a
246 negative impact on public service delivery in
247 Uzbekistan because it was not accompanied by
248 the corresponding resources and consequently
249 worsened the quality and accessibility of public
250 services. Hence, the central government has dele-
251 gated numerous tasks and service delivery respon-
252 sibilities to the local governments without
253 providing adequate funding (Kandiyoti 2007;
254 Noori 2006). One of the key challenges to
255 improve the performance of local governments
256 in Uzbekistan is to bridge the gap between
257 their economic and social functions and the
258 meagre financial means available for their
259 implementation.
260 The healthcare provision situation is also
261 problematic. In Uzbekistan, the healthcare system
262 is financed by the state, which means medical
263 services should be free of charge. However,
264 the healthcare system is de facto private and
265 highly reliant on informal forms of financing.
266 Most patients have to make informal payments
267 to medical professionals in order to receive proper
268 medical treatment, even though the public author-
269 ities claim that citizens are entitled to free medical
270 care. Local governments do not have sufficient
271 resources to maintain adequately the healthcare
272 infrastructures, the majority of which were built
273 during the Soviet period.
274 A similar situation can also be observed in the
275 field of education. Due to their vulnerable finan-
276 cial situation, local governments do not have suf-
277 ficient resources to maintain local schools and
278 provide an adequate number of books or to build
279 modern sports facilities. The parents usually cover
280 these expenditures.
281 These problems can be largely explained by
282 the fact that the local governments in Uzbekistan
283 have limited financial autonomy and are strongly
284 dependent on the central government (Ergashev
285 et al. 2006; Sievers 2002; Urinboyev 2015). Local
286 budgets mainly consist of transfers from the cen-
287 tral government and local tax revenues. Local
288 budget planning is centralized and closely tied to
289 the national budget. This implies that central gov-
290 ernment bodies determined the revenue bases of
291the local budgets. The local governments cannot
292independently establish tax rates or collect their
293own revenues through local taxes, with the excep-
294tion of some insignificant local fees, taxes, and
295duties, such as a land tax. National budget funds
296are redistributed among different regions by
297deducting budget surpluses from the regions that
298perform well and making allocations in the form
299of subventions, subsidies, or equalization trans-
300fers to vulnerable regions that cannot cover their
301needs. The revenues collected from local taxes
302constitute a small portion of the local govern-
303ments’ revenues and are insufficient for covering
304even the basic expenses. Hence, the ability of
305local governments to raise their own revenues is
306considerably limited, and they remain dependent
307on transfers from the central government to fulfill
308their service delivery functions. Consequently,
309they neither enjoy fiscal autonomy nor do they
310receive transfers from the central government that
311are sufficient to meet their service delivery needs
312(Leschenko and Troschke 2006).
313Due to the incapacity of the local government
314to address adequately the local needs, social
315mahallas have evolved to respond to the declining
316state capacity in the post-Soviet era, acting as a
317pseudo-local government entity. This means that
318people living in the same neighborhood (mahalla)
319pool their efforts and engage in mutual aid prac-
320tices by exchanging labor, money, material goods,
321and services. Typical mutual aid practices include
322the community financing of constructing irriga-
323tion facilities, cleaning streets, asphalting roads,
324building houses or mosques, organizing wed-
325dings, funerals and circumcision feasts, and
326many other services not provided by the local
327government.
328The Relations Between the Central and
329Local Government
330The local government in Uzbekistan functions in a
331rather complex environment characterized by an
332authoritarian political culture, limited financial
333autonomy, and weak local legislative bodies.
334The power and functions between the central
335state agencies and local governments are
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336 ambiguously distributed, which largely derives
337 from the deficiencies in national laws that do
338 not clearly specify the functions and powers
339 across various tiers of the government. The central
340 government bodies make most of the administra-
341 tive decisions concerning district and regional
342 public service delivery issues. In these bodies, a
343 hierarchy of power starts at the ministry, followed
344 by the ministry’s main regional departments, and
345 followed by the district or city units. Ministries
346 control the daily activities of their territorial
347 agencies and directly appoint their heads, in
348 coordination with the governor, which implies
349 that the territorial units of the ministries are
350 accountable to their central bodies and thereby
351 rarely coordinate with local governments.
352 Local councils, despite having official status
353 as local legislative bodies, are in practice subordi-
354 nated to the local state administrations. Hence,
355 institutions of self-governance fulfill completely
356 different functions and aims than the officially
357 declared ones. This means that there is very
358 little or no understanding of the true essence
359 of local government reform in the country. As
360 Abdukhalilov (2007) notes, in Uzbekistan,
361 administrative reforms are often understood as a
362 cutback in staff or an attempt to save money.More
363 importantly, administrative reforms do not con-
364 tain a single paragraph about the necessity to
365 change the hierarchical norms and mentality of
366 the managers.
367 Accordingly, Uzbekistan’s public administra-
368 tion system can hardly be regarded as
369 “decentralized” given that local governments are
370 highly dependent on the central government at
371 all levels – administratively, financially, and polit-
372 ically. Overdependence on the central government
373 limits the ability of local governments to support
374 local development. The malfunctioning local
375 governments are mainly the outcome of a central-
376 ized government that does not delegate any real
377 autonomy to local administrations (Bektemirov
378 and Rahimov 2001). Under these circumstances
379 political and civil servants at all levels do not feel
380 any accountability to the citizens; rather, they try
381 to meet the expectations of those who have the
382 power and authority to hire them. Public partici-
383 pation in local politics is almost nonexistent, and
384local elections are merely used to assert and legit-
385imize the central government’s influence in the
386periphery. Openness and transparency are not
387viewed as a norm in the day-to-day operations of
388the local administrations. Local government offi-
389cials care less about informing people about their
390work or listening to their opinions on the level and
391quality of public services. They are chiefly
392concerned with fulfilling the orders and expecta-
393tions of the central government.
394Concluding Remarks
395As shown in the previous sections, the relation-
396ship between the local state administrations and
397the central government is often based on subordi-
398nate relations rather than on mutual cooperation.
399Local government reform is interpreted merely
400in terms of citizens’ active participation in local
401government, but other key conditions for local
402self-government (i.e., autonomy of local self-
403government structures from the state) are largely
404neglected (Ilkhamov 2004; Urinboyev 2015). As
405the results demonstrate, the core challenge hinder-
406ing local government reform in Uzbekistan comes
407from the persistence of authoritarian style admin-
408istrative practices. Although there have been some
409local government reform initiatives in the country,
410they remain “on paper” and have little or no effect
411on the governance processes. In practice, the local
412governments continue to be subordinated to the
413central government in all public policy issues, be
414it education, taxation, health care, welfare, or
415agriculture. As a result, the local governments do
416not have any real capacity to adequately address
417the needs and concerns of citizens, as they are
418merely concerned with implementing centrally
419designed policies.
420Another area of concern is financial autonomy.
421Since the local governments do not have a solid
422financial base and the important public policy
423decisions are made at the central government
424level, there is little or no possibility at the local
425level for citizens to voice their concerns about
426public goods and services. One visible conse-
427quence is the emergence of citizens’ alternatives:
428informal coping strategies that are based on
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429 mutual aid practices. These alternative strategies
430 are short-term solutions that have little to do with
431 local development issues and negatively influence
432 the image and legitimacy of the central govern-
433 ment. It is thus suggested that local government
434 reform should go beyond official proclamations
435 and rhetoric and grant more political and financial
436 autonomy in practice.
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